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R ecently I was contacted by Radio Wales. An eager young producer had heard I 
was writing a book on Churchill and secret 
intelligence. What, he asked, did I make of 
the news that the prime minister's top secret 
wartime intelligence files had been declassified 
and placed in the Public Record Office; would 
they reveal that Churchill had indeed known 
in advance about the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbour and deliberately withheld that 
intelligence from Roosevelt? 
Inwardly I groaned at the reappearance 
of this canard. It used to be that Roosevelt 
knew but failed to tell the American people. 
Now, according to James Rusbridger and Eric 
Nave in their 1991 book Betrayal at Pearl 
Harbour; How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into 
World War II, 1 Roosevelt is the victim and 
Churchill the villain, as suggested by the 
subtitle. The argument is nonsense on at 
least two counts. The first is a matter oflogic 
and common sense. If Churchill had indeed 
known about Pearl Harbour in advance, it 
would have made far more sense for him to 
have told Roosevelt. The Japanese attack 
would have failed, the United States would 
have gone to war with its Pacific Fleet 
unscathed, and Churchill would have 
accumulated an enormous credit with the 
President. 
But Churchill did NOT know about Pearl 
Harbour in advance. Rusbridger and Nave-
a wartime Far East cryptolinguist who had 
left the Far East Combined Bureau in 
Singapore (Britain's Far Eastern code breaking 
operation) before 1941 and the events in 
question- claim that the British were reading 
the Japanese Navy's main cryptosystem, JN-
25, and therefore must have known of 
Japanese intentions. Indeed they were, or 
rather had been. But by December 1941 the 
basic JN-25 had received several additives 
and was almost impenetrable. Code breakers 
in the Far East were actually READING (as 
distinct from intercepting) very few JN-25 
messages, and none of them from significant 
operational traffic. That was why Malcolm 
Kennedy, a Japanese expert at Bletchley Park, 
was pestered by telephone calls from Churchill 
throughout the week preceding Pear Harbour 
for any indications of Japanese intentions. 
When the attack was announced, Kennedy-
on duty on 7 December - was taken 
completely by surprise. 
An extensive demolition of the 
Rusbridger-Nave conspiracy theory has 
recently appeared in the International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 2 This, 
however, was far too complex an argument 
for the soundbite offered me by Radio Wales. 
So I contented myself with assuring listeners 
that undoubtedly the new PRO files would lay 
the matter to rest for once and for all. But 
just to be on the safe side, I decided to take a 
look at them myself. 
The files, released only last November, 
contain signals intelligence that was passed 
directly to Churchill by the Government Code 
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and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. 
Invariably, they contain a cover note signed 
by "C," Sir Stewart Menzies, head of the 
Secret Intelligence Service, in his famous 
green ink. The selection usually has three 
elements: reports relating to enemy ground 
and air forces derived from high grade ciphers 
such as ENIGMA; naval headlines with 
summaries of German, Italian (and Spanish) 
activity; and BJ reports- selected transcripts 
of intercepted diplomatic telegrams. There 
are over a thousand files. The first dates from 
27 September 1940, the request from 
Churchill to Menzies that he receive daily 
briefings. 
What Churchill made of the material is 
difficult to say. Occasionally he underlines 
items in his red ink, sometimes he asks for 
clarification, and often he makes no comment 
at all. As Hinsley has pointed out, the volume 
of material was enormous, it took an expert 
analyst to understand its significance, and 
by the end of the war the Bletchley park 
output was so immense that Churchill could 
not possibly have mastered it. For all his 
desire to be his own intelligence officer, the 
very success of Bletchley Park prevented this 
from happening. 3 
What the material did do, however, was 
provide Churchill with a means of keeping his 
chiefs of staff and commanders in the field on 
their toes. They knew that he relished his 
"golden eggs" and that secret intelligence was 
manna to the prime minister. Even if he 
swallowed it undigested, they knew he would 
almost certainly regurgitate it at some 
unwelcome moment. Red ink or not, the files 
were weapons of war in Churchill's adamant 
demand that he, and he alone, bore the 
supreme responsibility for the British war 
effort. 
Without a mastery of the military 
background and a full understanding of the 
enemy order of battle at any given moment, 
the researcher in the PRO is worse off than 
Churchill, at least where the Enigma material 
is concerned. The diplomatic intercepts make 
more immediate sense, and there is a large 
number of them, more than the recent 
concentration on military intercepts has 
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encouraged us to expect. On 6 December 
1941 we can see that Churchill read the text 
of a message from the Foreign Minister in 
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in London 
that heralded an imminent crisis. It instructed 
him to destroy all except certain key codes 
and burn files and secret documents. "As 
these are precautions envisaging an 
emergency" Tokyo told the Ambassador, "you 
should communicate this to no one but your 
own staff and you should redouble your 
attention to your duties and maintain your 
calm and respect." No wonder Churchill was 
on the telephone to Kennedy at Bletchley 
asking if he knew where the first blow would 
fall. 
The files received by Churchill on 6 
December make no mention of Pearl Harbour. 
There is, however, an omission in the PRO 
material. On that day Churchill received 
three Bletchley files. The first (HW /302) 
contains 22 "special messages," i.e. Enigma 
intercepts. All relate to enemy activity in 
North Mrica. The third (HW /304). likewise 
contains nothing relating to the Far East. 
The blue cover note on the second, HW /303, 
says that it contains 17 BJs, 3 special 
messages, and 1 summary of a naval message. 
In fact it contains only the BJs, all of them. 
The other items are missing. What were 
they? Where have they gone? In such gaps do 
conspiracy theories flourish, although for the 
reasons given above there's no reason to 
believe that this one would support the 
Rusbridger /Nave thesis. 
Another file, however, grabbed my 
attention in the few hours I had to spare at 
Kew. The second in the special intelligence 
series, dated February 26, 1941 (why such a 
long gap since the first?) is indexed as follows: 
"C to PM requesting permission to reveal to 
US progress with German armed forces 
cryptography." Alas, thefilewasouttoanother 
reader, and I did not get to see it. Another 
series, however, touched on the same delicate 
issue of intelligence sharing. The Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) files up to the 
end of 1941 have now been released. Trawling 
around the Pearl Harbour date in this series 
I found nothing suggesting foreknowledge -
indeed the Committee's last meeting before 
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the day of infamy was 3 December 1941, and 
none of the items dealt with the Far East. But 
on 30 December, with the Americans now 
fully engaged against both Japan and 
Germany- and with Churchill in Washington 
wining and dining with Roosevelt- it turned 
its attention to what the Americans should be 
told about Britain's intelligence. The 
committee concluded that most secret 
methods of intelligence acquisition should 
not be divulged to the Americans. 
This might come as a shock to those 
who have bought into the Churchill-Roosevelt 
buddy theory of the Second World War, the 
tale of how two friendly nations linked arms 
and unreservedly shared their most intimate 
secrets from the beginning to the end. It was 
not quite so simple. Indeed, the issue of 
wartime intelligence sharing was extremely 
complex. Seeing the JIC decision in black 
and white drove home what I had just been 
reading about in a superb piece of research 
by Bradley Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and 
the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940-
1946. 4 I can recommend it to anyone. 
In a detailed examination of sources in 
Washington and London, Smith traces the 
slow and uncertain evolution of SIGINT-
sharing (signals intelligence) between the 
British and the Americans, covering in some 
200 pages what Hinsley and the official 
historians dealt with in fewer than 20. 5 The 
path to co-operation and collaboration was 
strewn with difficulties and suspicions on 
both sides. On the British side, showing the 
product of Ultra to the Americans was not the 
problem. Sources and methods, as the JIC 
meeting I've quoted indicates, were. Smith 
shows that the service intelligence heads, as 
well as 'C', were adamantly opposed to opening 
cryptanalytic doors any further to the 
Americans at this stage. In the Atlantic, they 
were receiving all they needed through Ultra 
material that was 'wrapped up' in items they 
already received from the Admiralty's 
Operational Intelligence Centre. As for the 
U.S. Army, it had no operational need of such 
high grade intelligence at this stage of the 
war. Besides, American security was not yet 
good enough for the British in general or 
Churchill in particular, who was rightly 
obsessive on the subject. 
Subsequently, the British opened up 
only very slowly, and there was intense 
bargaining between the two allies. Co-
operation, Smith insists, was driven by hard-
headed operational need, not sentiment. No 
general British-American agreement on 
military cryptanalytic co-operation was 
reached until May 1943, with the Washington 
BRUSA accord, when the needs of joint army 
operations made it imperative and the British 
had come to see that only the Americans 
could pay for the huge technical infrastructure 
required to maintain and increase the 
cryptanalytic effort required for victory. Per 
contra, they were ready much earlier to share 
cryptanalytic information with the U.S. Navy. 
This was because of desperate needs in the 
Atlantic; a naval agreement about this was 
signed between the U.S. Navy's 
communications wizard, Commander Joseph 
Wenger and GC and CS director Edward 
Travis on 1 October 1942. 
It is always easy to get too close to a 
subject- especially the raw documents- to 
see it properly. For all his emphasis on the 
obstacles along the way and the pragmatic 
concerns that governed so much of the 
exchanges, Smith avoids the danger. He 
acknowledges the importance of the personal 
Churchill- Roosevelt link. Their early 
determination to work closely together 
provided the basic groundwork on which co-
operation would eventually be built. Had 
either leader been opposed, there would be no 
story to tell. And he acknowledges that the 
transatlantic intelligence relationship was, 
when finally consummated, unique and 
unprecedented, providing the essential basis 
for postwar collaboration. "Here," he writes, 
was a true revolution in interstate relations 
that would . . . guarantee a postwar 
continuation of the special relationship, 
because once the two countries so 
completely opened up their cryptanalytic 
secrets to each other, there was no way to 
terminate the arrangements without 
seriously lessening the intelligence-
gathering capability of both partners. 6 
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Hence, in September 1945, HarryTruman 
agreed to continue the transatlantic SIGINT 
relationship. Two years later Washington 
and London signed the UKUSA agreement of 
194 7, the cornerstone of Cold War 
transatlantic SIGINT co-operation and the 
very heart of the "special relationship." 
Smith touches only lightly on two 
important aspects ofthe story. The first is the 
question of non-military SIGINT. BRUSA, 
while extensive, did NOT cover diplomatic 
traffic. This, by and large, still remains a 
neglected story in the history of intelligence 
during the Second World War (although, of 
course, Magic- the intercepts of Japanese 
diplomatic traffic- has always loomed large in 
the literature). Interestingly, the first venue 
in which American personnel were actually 
allowed to screen traffic decrypted by the 
British was at the Berkeley Street operation 
run by Bletchley Park's former commander, 
Alastair Denniston. Here the target was 
enemy and neutral commercial and diplomatic 
traffic. Much of it came from the tapping of 
cables, and, despite the BRUSA exclusion, by 
October 1943 the Americans were receiving 
"almost all the diplomatic traffic that goes 
over cables other than the cables passing 
through the United States."7 Not a bad 
achievement, as Smith says, for an agreement 
not intended to cover such traffic! There is 
still plenty of work to do on this story. To tell 
how we spied on the enemy is one thing. But 
governments have been super-sensitive in 
concealing the extent to which they spied on 
neutrals, and even allies. 
The other issue barely dealt with, of 
course, is Canada, invariably the neglected 
partner in stories of transatlantic intelligence 
sharing. There are only a few references to 
Canada in Smith's account, and in one of 
them he omits its particular significance for 
the Canadian side of the story. In late August/ 
early September 1941 Alastair Denniston, 
still at that time head of Bletchley Park, 
visited Ottawa and Washington. It was the 
first transatlantic visit by a senior 
representative of Britain's codebreakers, and 
Smith rightly sees it as highly important in 
the move towards "full, high-level 
cryptanalytic co-operation between the United 
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States and the British Commonwealth. "8 It 
was especially so in the light of Denniston's 
concerns about the security of Ultra and his 
belief in the importance of human 
relationships in such a sensitive field. His 
establishment on this trip of a good personal 
bond with the U.S. Army's cryptographic 
genius, William Friedmann, marks an 
important stage in the story that Smith has to 
tell. What he does not tell us, however, is that 
this friendship was greatly helped by the 
removal of an obstacle that had threatened to 
sabotage it from the outset. The name of the 
obstacle was Herbert Yardley, and at the time 
of Denniston's visit he was head of Canada's 
codebreaking operation, the Examination 
Unit. Yardley had notoriously revealed U.S. 
codebreaking secrets in his bestselling The 
American Black Chamber (1931). In spite of 
this, Ottawa had chosen him to head up 
Canada's first independent codebreaking 
effortinJune 1941. LondonandWashington 
quickly declared Yardley persona non grata 
and said that Canada could expect no allied 
co-operation until it got rid of him. 
Denniston's visit put the final boot in, and 
Yardley was fired. 
Canada, the Yardley fiasco, and 
Canada's role in wartime SIGINT, including 
diplomatic SIGINT, have now been treated in 
another recent book, by John Bryden. 9 To 
that, I will turn my attention next time. 
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War Through the Ages 
Robert Vogel 
John Keegan. A History oJWaifare. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, 432 pages, $36.95. 
K eegan's A History of Warfare is a long and very uneven account of the 
"organized violence" which has dogged the 
history of humanity since the beginning of 
organized society. The attempt to encompass 
the whole of the human race in his account is 
wholly praiseworthy as are his divisions of 
warfare into four main sections - stone, 
flesh, iron and fire - which roughly 
correspond with the weapons at the disposal 
of the combatants. These sections are 
interrupted by four quite separate and often 
quite unrelated essays on topics such as 
"Limitations on Warmaking," "Fortifications," 
"Armies" and "Logistics and Supply." Keegan's 
military history is conventional; he deals 
adequately with various well-rehearsed topics 
from Alexander the Great to Hitler, adding 
little to what he and many other historians 
have said in similar but usually less ambitious 
accounts. One drawback of trying to do so 
much, however, is that the period for which 
there is most evidence, that is the last five 
hundred years, is covered in a rather 
breathless fashion in the chapter entitled 
"Fire" which attempts to encompass the 
history of warfare for the whole world from 
the first cannon to the hydrogen bomb in 69 
pages, of which thirteen are devoted to the 
Second World War. 
Had Keegan restricted himself to the 
history of warfare he would have produced a 
reasonable and sometimes stimulating 
account. Unfortunately he tries to do much 
more than that. The whole first section, some 
60 pages, seems to be a speculative essay, 
entitled "War in Human History" which has 
less to do with history and more to do with an 
attack on Clausewitz. He begins with the 
portentous statement that "War is not a 
continuation of policy by other means" [p.3]. 
Contradicting Clausewitz is hardly an earth-
shaking position. The problem is, however, 
that from there on, and for the next twenty-
five pages, Clausewitz serves as a kind of 
whipping-horse for some of Keegan's less 
carefully considered flights of fancy. 
Clausewitz becomes a symbol for all things 
that Keegan considers have gone wrong with 
ancient society. This is apparently because 
Clausewitz was a "child of Aristotle" and 
therefore believed in the supreme importance 
of "politics." Warfare, argues Keegan, is not 
an extension of politics but of"culture." That 
may be an entirely defensible position but 
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